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These papers are for discussion purposes only and are not endorsed by the PC Party of Manitoba. If you would like to suggest other papers for consideration, please email us, including a link to the paper, at
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Summary of Research:
Minimum Sitting Dates
Partisan Advertising by Incumbent Governments
Good Government for Manitobans: Democratic Renewal and Reform
Proportional Representation for Canada?
Why Redesign the Senate? The Goals of Reformers since 1867
A Powerful Canadian Senate: Implications for Parliamentary Government
A Powerful Senate: the Australian Experience
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Minimum Sitting Dates
Source: Underneath the Golden Boy. Manitoba Law Journal, University of Manitoba. 2008. pp. 39-47.
by Bryan Schwartz & Andrew Buck
Synopsis
Manitoba’s current rules on House sitting allow the government to manipulate the schedule to its own benefit, with accountability and public policy sacrificed in favour of self preservation.
To address this problem the federal government and several provinces have created a set schedule for House sittings, thereby creating a minimum number of sitting dates. The authors argue that Manitoba should do the same.
The authors assert that the House has to be sitting to create an atmosphere of accountability, not only through the passage of laws, but also in question period.
The Manitoba Legislature is hindered by the need to rush bills through at the end of each session, where vision and planning fall victim to expediency.
The authors list the benefits of set sitting dates as:
An opportunity for frequent review of government initiatives and Crown corporations;
Regular meetings to discuss long-term planning;
Additional time for oversight and analysis of government administration.
From 2000-2005 the average number of sitting days in Manitoba was 66, compared to 76 from 1995-1999, lagging behind the federal government at 113 days, Ontario at 81 days.
Manitoba’s system allows the government of the day to avoid scrutiny of the opposition, the media and the public, which is bad for accountability, bad for policy and bad for governance.
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Partisan Advertising by Incumbent Governments
Source: Underneath the Golden Boy. Manitoba Law Journal, University of Manitoba. 2008. pp. 25-38 by Bryan Schwartz & Andrew Buck
Synopsis
The government has a major communications advantage over its rivals given its exclusive use of the public purse. Policy, jurisprudence and basic electoral fairness suggest reform should be undertaken to address the incumbent-challenger communications imbalance.
Two solutions include: a total ban on all publicly funded partisan government communication; and the creation of a publicly funded political communications regime that incumbents and challengers share.
Electoral finance reform in Manitoba has further exacerbated the power imbalance between incumbents and challengers.
The authors assert that competitiveness is an integral part of good governance and any reform that operates to restore a measure of fairness to the electoral process should be welcomed.
They argue that Canadian governments should follow Ontario’s lead and ban publicly funded partisan government advertising, or consider instituting a broad public funding regime that allows equal access to this type of communications.
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Good Government for Manitobans: Democratic Renewal and Reform
Source: PC Manitoba White Paper (Fall 2006)
Synopsis:
General discussion paper which presents an overview of the myriad of governance issues developing within Manitoba;
Primarily identifies areas of concern in relation to areas such as Legislative Committees, Electoral Reform, Access To Information & Government Accountability;
Includes a handful concrete proposals for policy action such as increasing the funding for the Auditor General's office, mission statements for legislative committees & annual public disclosure of Ministerial expenses (though some proposals, such as fixed elections dates for one, have since been addressed)
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Proportional Representation for Canada?
Source: Schwartz, Bryan. Proportional Representation for Canada? (2001) 28 Manitoba Law Journal 133.
Link: http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/resources/submissions/csharman-10_0401141627-764.pdf
Synopsis:
Opens with a criticism of Canada remaining one of the few western democracies to not include some form of proportional representation.
Proposes the "20% Solution" - a hybrid of the current system and proportional representation.
"20% Solution" highlights:
Same number of current seats in elected assemblies with constituencies to be grouped into regions;
80% going to our current first-past-the-post elections and once completed, the results are compared to those that would arise from a strict proportional representation election;
The remaining 20% is assigned based on ranked lists - submitted by parties prior to the election - in a way that evens out the distortions between the actual and the ideal proportional representation results;
No member of the elected assembly can sit as a party list member for more than one term;
No party list member can serve in cabinet;
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Why Redesign the Senate? The Goals of Reformers since 1867
Source: Why Redesign the Senate? The Goals of Reformers since 1867, By: David E. Smith, University of Saskatchewan and Senior Policy Fellow Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy. Paper prepared for the conference on ‘transforming Canadian Governance Through Senate Reform’, Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions. University of British Columbia, (April 19-20, 2007)
Link:
http://democracy.ubc.ca/fileadmin/template/main/images/departments/CSDI/conferences/
Article Synopsis:
This article examines the history surrounding the development and reform of the Senate and discusses some implications of Senate reform, particularly against the background of past reformers and founding fathers.
Regardless of the Senate’s current makeup the author argues that Senators treat their deliberative and investigative work very seriously.
The author notes that everyone dismisses an unelected Senate, but no one takes any real action on changing the Senate.
The author argues that a Triple E senate is an Albertan cause coming from a province where its partisan complexion has only been the same as the federal government for 16 years out of its 101 year history.
The article suggests that a likely scenario for an elected Senate with a non-renewable term would be for individuals to start their political careers in the Senate and then move to the House of Commons altering the Senate as a chamber of experience.
DavidSmithUBCSenateConferencePaper.pdf
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A Powerful Canadian Senate: Implications for Parliamentary Government
Source: A Powerful Canadian Senate: Implications for Parliamentary Government, By: Graham White, University of Toronto at Mississauga. Paper prepared for the conference on ‘transforming Canadian Governance Through Senate Reform’, Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions. University of British Columbia, (April 19-20, 2007)
Link: http://democracy.ubc.ca/fileadmin/template/main/images/departments/CSDI/conferences/
GrahamWhiteUBCSenateConferencePaper.pdf
Article Synopsis:
This article examines the parliamentary implications that would come about via an enhanced and powerful Canadian Senate.
The author argues that the only way that the Canadian Senate could wield real power would be through the election of its members.
The author argues that parties would continue to dominate the Senate and the likelihood of independent Senators would be few and far between.
The author suggests that the Senate will be regionally weighted, but will become more of a party house than a province house in Parliament.
If the Senate is not elected through single member plurality the author argues there is a good chance that the composition of the House and the Senate will differ substantially, and a mechanism to prevent ‘deadlock’ will have to be engineered.
The author predicts that the Senate’s ability to produce “detailed, thoughtful, and oftentimes hard-hitting reports” may not be as active or as valuable with a reformed Senate.
The author argues that the parliamentary process will become slower with an enhanced Senate, however he predicts that the ability of the Senate to improve legislation for better government will likely not change.
According to the author a far more pressing concern than reforming the Senate is the need to curtail the centralizing of power in the hands of the Prime Minister. |
A Powerful Senate: the Australian Experience
Source: A Powerful Senate: The Australian Experience, By: Bruce Stone, University of Western Australia. Paper prepared for the conference on ‘transforming Canadian Governance Through Senate Reform’, Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions. University of British Columbia, (April 19-20, 2007: Revised 23, April, 2007)
Link: http://democracy.ubc.ca/fileadmin/template/main/images/departments/CSDI/conferences/
BruceStoneUBCSenateConferencePaper.pdf
Article Synopsis:
This article examines the role of the Australian Senate in the Australian parliamentary processes, highlighting its powerful role in the Australian Parliament, as well as examining pros and cons of its role.
The author argues that the Senate has received significant power from its 6 year terms and its controversial ability to block a budget, thereby forcing a government to an election.
The election of smaller third parties to the Senate, and its varying political outcomes has fostered increased political respect for the institution.
Because the Senate is democratically elected its legitimacy has increased. The author notes that since the Senate is elected via proportional representation it provides a more accurate reflection of electoral opinion than the chambers in which executive government is based.
The emergence of the strong Australian Senate has “bolstered the Parliament’s core functions of law making and scrutiny of the executive.”
Criticisms of the Senate are that it may impede a government that has the majority of the lower house from enacting its mandate.
Since the Senate can block the budget, an Opposition with control of the Senate can deny funds to the government for the sole purpose of forcing an election which suits the opposition.
The author argues that electing senators through proportional representation has created a situation where senators “adopt the highly party-oriented perceptions of their parliamentary role”.
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